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Virtual reality (“VR”) and augmented reality (“AR”) technologies are rapidly maturing. Companies like
Facebook and Microsoft are capitalizing on these technologies and actively releasing products to consumers.
Both companies’ products blur the line between the real world and the virtual world. The blurring of this line
presents novel questions regarding the protection of digital intellectual property that exists solely within the
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One such question is whether design patent protection will be available to three-dimensional digital models,
models of real-world items that are digitally reproduced in the virtual world. To receive design patent
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Trade Commission, is at odds with design patent’s § 171.
This Comment analyzes § 171 and its broad interpretation by the Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). After, the Comment contends that the Federal Circuit’s current trend
deviates from the CCPA’s precedent and argues that the court should return to the broad interpretation of §
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COMMENT 
REDEFINING REALITY:  WHY DESIGN 
PATENT PROTECTION SHOULD  
EXPAND TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD 
JOHN R. BOULÉ III* 
 Virtual reality (“VR”) and augmented reality (“AR”) technologies are 
rapidly maturing.  Companies like Facebook and Microsoft are capitalizing on 
these technologies and actively releasing products to consumers.  Both 
companies’ products blur the line between the real world and the virtual world.  
The blurring of this line presents novel questions regarding the protection of 
digital intellectual property that exists solely within the virtual world. 
One such question is whether design patent protection will be available to 
three-dimensional digital models, models of real-world items that are digitally 
reproduced in the virtual world.  To receive design patent protection, 35 
U.S.C. § 171 requires, inter alia, that the subject matter be an “article of 
manufacture.”  Based on existing precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, it appears the court is reluctant to expand design patent 
protection to three-dimensional digital models. 
  This Comment argues that the apparent reluctance of the Federal Circuit 
to expand intellectual property protections to three-dimensional digital models, 
as signaled in its recent decisions in In re Nuijten and ClearCorrect 
                                                          
 * Editor-in-Chief, American University Law Review, Volume 67; J.D. candidate, 
May 2018, American University Washington College of Law; B.S., Optical Engineering, 
2012, University of Rochester.  I would like to extend a thank you to my colleagues on 
the Law Review for their help in preparing this piece for publication.  In particular, I 
would like to thank Lisa Southerland and Josh Moore for diving with me into the 
worlds of virtual reality and design patent law.  To my faculty advisor and mentor, 
Jonas Anderson, thank you for your valuable advice and continued guidance.  
Finally, thank you to my family and friends, especially Desi Kireva, for your constant 
encouragement and support. 
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Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission, is at odds with 
design patent’s § 171.  This Comment analyzes § 171 and its broad 
interpretation by the Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (CCPA).  After, the Comment contends that the Federal 
Circuit’s current trend deviates from the CCPA’s precedent and argues that the 
court should return to the broad interpretation of § 171.  This broad 
interpretation would provide design patent protection to three-dimensional 
digital models present in VR and AR worlds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“What is real?  How do you define ‘real’?  If you’re talking about what you 
can feel, what you can smell, what you can taste and see, then ‘real’ is simply 
electrical signals interpreted by your brain.” 1 
 
Given the explosion of virtual reality (“VR”), an environment 
where the real world is replaced with a virtual one, and augmented 
reality (“AR”), an environment where the real world is supplemented 
by computer-generated input,2 this once futuristic quote from The 
Matrix has become more relevant today.  These technologies are 
available to consumers through a variety of gadgets, ranging from 
high-end headsets, such as the Oculus Rift,3 to more common 
products, such as a smartphone screen and camera that are used in 
Pokémon Go.4  These technologies seek to immerse the user in a 
virtual reality, seamlessly merging the real and electronic worlds.5  As 
                                                          
 1. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999). 
 2. Vivek Sharma, Technology Startups:  The Game-Changers of Virtual and Augmented 
Reality, IPWATCHDOG (June 18, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/18/tec 
hnology-startups-virtual-augmented-reality/id=70162. 
 3. See Max Chafkin, Why Facebook’s $2 Billion Bet on Oculus Rift Might One Day 
Connect Everyone on Earth, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 8, 2015, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/09/oculus-rift-mark-zuckerberg-cover-story-
palmer-luckey (describing how the Oculus Rift made the user flinch when lighting 
firecrackers in a virtual world). 
 4. See Victor Thomson, “Pokemon Go” Game Totally Changes Virtual Reality World, 
ITECH POST (Aug. 13, 2016, 3:20 AM), http://www.itechpost.com/articles/24335/20 
160813/pokemon-go-game-totally-changes-virtual-reality-world.htm (reporting that 
the app uses the “smartphone’s GPS to find, train, fight, and capture virtual 
creatures that are superimposed on the real world”). 
 5. See Vamien McKalin, Augmented Reality vs. Virtual Reality:  What Are the 
Differences and Similarities?, TECH TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014, 10:25 PM), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/5078/20140406/augmented-reality-vs-virtual-
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touted by most manufacturers of VR and AR technology, this 
technology provides a new canvas for movies, video games, and 
advertisers.6  Content developers create these worlds using three-
dimensional models, which are computer-programmed models that 
mimic items in our world.7  Once the technology matures, the line 
between the physical world and the virtual world may seemingly 
disappear.8  As this line disappears, it may become impossible to 
distinguish a physical object from a virtual three-dimensional digital 
model placed right next to it.9 
Unsurprisingly, the explosion of these technologies presents new 
challenges and questions regarding intellectual property rights.10  
One question involving the interaction between intellectual property 
and the VR and AR worlds is whether a three-dimensional digital model 
will meet the statutory requirements for a design patent, which protects 
the aesthetic appearance of a functional item.11  In recent years, design 
patents have grown in value, making them important parts of an 
intellectual property portfolio.12  As the use of VR and AR continues to 
grow, individuals and businesses will likely seek to use such patents to 
protect the three-dimensional digital models used in these worlds. 
                                                          
reality-what-are-the-differences-and-similarities.htm (concluding that AR might prove 
more successful because it does not completely remove a user from the real world). 
 6. See, e.g., Aaron Luber, What Virtual Reality Will Mean for Advertising, THINK 
WITH GOOGLE (June 2016), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/articles/virtual-reality-
advertising.html (noting that VR can work with pre-existing media in the 
entertainment industry to create new experiences). 
 7. See What Is Virtual Reality?, VIRTUAL REALITY SOC’Y, https://www.vrs.org.uk/virt 
ual-reality/what-is-virtual-reality.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
 8. See McKalin, supra note 5. 
 9. See Katie Collins, Oculus Can Now Transform the Real World into a Video Game, 
WIRED U.K. (May 27, 2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/oculus-acquires-surreal-
vision-to-map-virtual-reality-worlds (describing a technology that allows Oculus users 
to interact with real world objects in the virtual world). 
 10. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Purow, Virtual Reality May Create Novel IP Issues in the Real 
World, LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2016, 10:10 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/769479/ 
virtual-reality-may-create-novel-ip-issues-in-the-real-world. 
 11. See General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents. 
 12. See Tracey-Gene Durkin, IPO Report Shows Design Patent Filings Continue to Rise, 
IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/08/19/ipo-
report-shows-design-patent-filings-continue-to-rise/id=44720 (overviewing an 
Intellectual Property Owners Association report that demonstrated a rise in design 
patent applications); Gene Quinn, Design Patents:  The Under Utilized and Overlooked 
Patent, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/10/de 
sign-patents/id=72714 (arguing that design patents are becoming a more useful tool 
to protect an invention). 
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Although the need for design patent protection of three-
dimensional models has grown, design patent protection for the 
models has an uncertain legal future.  Congress last updated the 
design patent statute in 1952 when it amended 35 U.S.C. § 171 to 
grant a design patent to “[w]hoever invents any new, original and 
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”13  Thus, to receive 
a design patent, the design must be “for an article of manufacture.”14  
As written, the scope of the article of manufacture requirement is 
unclear, but throughout the twentieth century, courts were willing to 
interpret the requirement fairly broadly.15  However, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently articulated a narrower 
view, first when applying the requirement to electronic and digital 
technologies,16 and next when interpreting article of manufacture 
requirements in statutes akin to § 171.17 
This Comment argues that as VR and AR technologies develop, the 
Federal Circuit and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
should interpret the design patent subject matter protection statute 
broadly, incorporating three-dimensional digital models into its 
scope.  Part I provides background, surveying the history and current 
state of the art of VR and AR technologies, and reviews the USPTO’s 
and the courts’ interpretations of § 171 of the design patent statute.  
Part II then argues that courts should apply a broad interpretation of 
the article of manufacture requirement as adopted by the U.S. Court 
of Customs and Patents Appeals (CCPA), and that the Federal Circuit 
improperly narrowed the scope of an “article of manufacture” when 
it applied the requirement to three-dimensional digital models. 
I. VIRTUAL AND AUGMENTED REALITY:  ITS ROOTS, ITS CURRENT 
STATE, AND THE TREATMENT OF SIMILAR TECHNOLOGIES IN COURT 
The recent advancement of VR and AR has put these technologies on 
a collision course with design patent law.  VR and AR technologies were 
created in the mid-twentieth century and are just reaching maturity 
                                                          
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Section I.C.2 (discussing early court interpretations of § 171). 
 16. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007); infra Section I.C.4 
(discussing the modern interpretation of § 171). 
 17. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286 
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam); 
infra Section I.C.4 (discussing the modern interpretation of § 171). 
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today.18  In contrast, Congress first created design patent protection in 
the mid-nineteenth century.19  As design patent law developed, courts 
initially maintained an inclusive view of the subject matter the design 
patent statute protected.20  Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has 
begun to narrow what subject matter may be protected.21 
A. An Overview of Virtual and Augmented Reality 
Understanding the challenges surrounding VR and AR 
technologies and intellectual property rights requires understanding 
the technology itself, especially its history and the current state of the 
virtual and augmented art. 
1. A brief history of virtual and augmented reality 
Depending on how virtual and augmented reality are defined, the two 
have a surprisingly long history.22  In the 1950s and 1960s, inventors 
launched various digital and electronic technologies that established the 
VR world, including both commercial and defense technologies.23 
In the commercial realm, inventors created entertainment 
technologies to rudimentarily stimulate the user’s senses—sight, 
sound, smell, and touch.24  In the defense realm, Air Force-funded 
                                                          
 18. See infra Section I.A (surveying the history of VR and AR, the issues inventors 
have encountered during development, and the current state of the art). 
 19. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44; see also In re Schnell, 
46 F.2d 203, 205 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (discussing the history of the design patent statute). 
 20. See infra Section I.C.1–3 (detailing the expansion of the article of 
manufacture requirement from small mechanical features, to large immovable 
objects, to software icons). 
 21. See infra Section I.C.4 (reviewing recent decisions of the Federal Circuit that 
signal a narrow interpretation of the article of manufacture requirement). 
 22. See generally History of Virtual Reality, VIRTUAL REALITY SOC’Y, 
http://www.vrs.org.uk/virtual-reality/history.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2017) 
(presenting the chronological history of VR technology from paintings to modern 
devices, such as the Oculus Rift). 
 23. Adi Robertson & Michael Zelenko, The Rise and Fall of Virtual Reality:  Voices 
from a Virtual Past, VERGE, http://www.theverge.com/a/virtual-reality/oral_history 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2017); see also History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22.  Some 
consider large, nineteenth-century panoramic paintings, which had the goal of fully 
immersing the viewer into a historic event, or nineteenth-century stereoscopes, which 
combined two images into a three-dimensional image to the viewer, as the first VR 
technologies.  See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22; Robertson & Zelenko, supra. 
 24. See Robertson & Zelenko, supra note 23 (describing filmmaker Morton 
Heilig’s invention, the Sensorama, which Heilig imagined to be the “cinema of the 
future” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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research improved flight simulators, moving beyond solely 
mechanical simulations and adding a digital-visual component.25 
As computer-based technology became more affordable to 
consumers in the 1970s and 1980s, video games exploded in the 
personal entertainment industry.26  During this period, video game 
systems shifted away from the large machines found in arcades 
towards smaller consoles used in the comfort of one’s home.27  The 
electronics industry’s shift from command line prompt control of 
computers to graphical user interface control resulted in the wider 
availability of video games.28  As the graphical display trend 
continued, the next step for the video game industry was moving 
from a screen to a fully-immersed VR video game experience.29 
Personal entertainment companies championed the quest to craft 
technology that could provide VR products for consumers.30  Despite 
the trend towards in-home video game consoles, video game 
companies began investing in research and development to create 
both arcade-based and personal VR video game equipment.31  In the 
early 1990s, companies such as Nintendo and Sega created VR-based 
video games for use outside of the arcade.32  However, because of 
technological shortcomings, the systems of the 1990s were never 
commercially successful; the graphical display systems of the products 
                                                          
 25. See id.  Some in the VR industry considered military flight simulators to be the 
cutting edge of the field until computers became pervasive in both business and 
personal use.  Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. (emphasizing the success of gaming pioneer Atari’s transition from 
arcades to homes). 
 28. Id.  Early users operated a computer by entering textual commands into an 
interface, such as MS-DOS.  Command Line Interface, TECHTERMS, 
https://techterms.com/definition/command_line_interface (last updated Aug. 26, 
2014).  Graphical user interface controls streamlined this process by allowing users to 
control a computer using tools like windows, icons, and menus.  Graphical User Interface, 
TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/gui (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
 29. See Robertson & Zelenko, supra note 23. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. (discussing the Atari Sunnyvale Research Laboratory, which was meant 
to “explore the future of digital entertainment”; however, the lab operated for only 
two years, closing after the video game crash of 1983). 
 32. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22 (detailing various VR products, 
including the Nintendo Virtual Boy and Sega’s VR glasses, both of which failed).  
Another company, Virtuality, cornered the arcade-based unit market.  See id.  
However, these systems proved unsuccessful because they failed to deliver an 
experience that kept users coming back.  See Kyle Fowle, A Look Back at the Doomed 
Virtual Reality Boom of the 90s, KILL SCREEN (Jan. 28, 2015), http://archive.is/5Lhba. 
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did not create the immersive experience that developers promised.33  
Specifically, the graphic systems, consisting of crude three-
dimensional digital models, failed to simulate actual, real-world 
environments.34  This failure caused the boom of the VR market in 
the 1990s to quickly bust, pushing the technology out of the personal 
entertainment industry’s spotlight.35  The graphic systems that 
remedied the issues of the technology and enabled VR success 
became available in the 2000s.36  These systems create the realistic 
environments that developers originally promised.37 
2. The current state of the art 
In the past five years, developers have made new strides in VR and 
AR technology.38  Inventors have remedied the issues that plagued 
the technologies in the 1980s and 1990s—mainly the poor graphical 
representation of three-dimensional models—through advancements 
in three-dimensional graphic systems.39  The reemergence of the 
technology has led to investments from the biggest consumer 
electronic companies, including Facebook, Microsoft, and Sony.40 
The Oculus Rift is setting the technological benchmark for the VR 
industry.41  Facebook purchased Oculus Rift for $2 billion in 2014, 
signaling that the social media company believed VR was ready for a 
                                                          
 33. Fowle, supra note 32 (characterizing the technology as “rudimentary” when 
consumers were promised “a glorious vision of the future”).  Additionally, primitive 
personal entertainment VR equipment was often bulky and awkward.  Id. (describing 
some of the equipment as allowing only “limited room for movement” and the early 
headsets as being “twice the size of your head and just as heavy and unbalanced”). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Robertson & Zelenko, supra note 23.  VR technology did not simply 
vanish, but the technology development operated with a lower profile.  Id.  Until 
VR’s reemergence later in the 2000s, the military became the biggest supporter of 
the technology.  Id. 
 36. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Stuart Dredge, Facebook Closes Its $2bn Oculus Rift Acquisition.  What 
Next?, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2014, 7:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology 
/2014/jul/22/facebook-oculus-rift-acquisition-virtual-reality. 
 39. See History of Virtual Reality, supra note 22 (emphasizing that advancements in 
graphical display engines and compact computing are driving the latest VR 
development); see also supra Section I.A.1 (discussing issues with the development of 
VR technology). 
 40. See Sharma, supra note 2 (outlining the leading investors in VR and AR 
technologies). 
 41. Michael Nuñez, How It Works:  The Oculus Rift, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://www.popsci.com/oculus-rift-how-it-works (naming the Oculus Rift “the most 
advanced virtual reality (VR) headset ever created”). 
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return to the consumer electronic spotlight.42  One of the main 
reasons for the publicity surrounding the Oculus Rift is that, for the 
first time in VR history, a unit is delivering “presence”—the feeling 
that the user is fully immersed in the virtual world.43  By creating 
presence, VR technology allows users to interact with a world where 
the three-dimensional models programmed into the system match 
those that users come across every day.44  Such virtual interactions can 
also allow the users to interact with items they would never come 
across, including luxury automobiles and militaristic weapons.45 
While Facebook has targeted the VR market, Microsoft has 
targeted VR’s sister, AR.46  Microsoft’s flagship AR product, the 
HoloLens, promises to merge the actual and virtual worlds into one.47  
Because the HoloLens technology actually augments the user’s 
perception of the real world, users are able to interact with digital 
models as if the model was on the workspace in front of them.48  
Other applications of the technology include a virtual-world 
television screen to watch a movie, or a virtual model of furniture to 
better imagine how the real-world product would fit in a living 
                                                          
 42. See Chafkin, supra note 3. 
 43. Ben Lang, Oculus Shares 5 Key Ingredients for the Presence in Virtual Reality, 
ROADTOVR (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.roadtovr.com/oculus-shares-5-key-
ingredients-for-presence-in-virtual-reality (quoting Martin J. Schumie et al., Research 
on Presence in Virtual Reality:  A Survey, 4 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 183, 185 (2001)) 
(defining “presence” as “a psychological state of subjective perception in which even 
though part or all of an individual’s current experience is generated by and/or 
filtered through human-made technology, part or all of the individual’s perception 
fails to accurately acknowledge the role of the technology in the experience”). 
 44. Collins, supra note 9. 
 45. See, e.g., Sam Loveridge & Lily Prasuethsut, The Best Oculus Rift Games, 
WAREABLE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.wareable.com/oculus-rift/the-best-oculus-rift-
games (listing various Oculus Rift game titles spanning from science fiction, military 
role playing, and sporting games). 
 46. See Sharma, supra note 2 (identifying Microsoft as the front runner in AR 
technology based on its 175 inventions filed as patents, compared to second-place 
Samsung with 140). 
 47. Terry Myerson, Opening Windows Holographic to Partners for a New Era of Mixed 
Reality, MICROSOFT (June 1, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://blogs.windows.com/windowsex 
perience/2016/06/01/opening-windows-holographic-to-partners-for-a-new-era-of-mixed-
reality (“Imagine wearing a VR device and seeing your physical hands as you 
manipulate an object, working on the scanned 3D image of a real object, or bringing 
in a holographic representation of another person into your virtual world so you can 
collaborate.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Microsoft HoloLens, Microsoft HoloLens:  Partners Make It Real, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzAwdBZ3KCQ 
(providing examples of the various partner industries for Microsoft’s AR 
technology). 
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room.49  As these examples illustrate, the technology’s goal is to fully 
integrate virtual and physical reality. 
VR and AR stand on the cusp of pushing the world into a new 
technological frontier, blurring the lines between the physical and 
virtual worlds.50  Consequently, they present new questions within 
intellectual property law, such as whether intellectual property 
protection should extend to three-dimensional digital models.51 
B. An Overview of Design Patent Protection 
A design patent is only one form of federal protection for 
intellectual property.  Federal law protects several forms of 
intellectual property:  copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and 
patents.52  A copyright protects an author’s or artist’s work,53 a 
                                                          
 49. See id. 
 50. See Myerson, supra note 47. 
 51. See Purow, supra note 10; Po Yi et al., Virtual Reality Creates Potential Real Legal 
Issues, VENABLE (July 9, 2015), https://www.venable.com/virtual-reality-creates-
potentially-real-legal-issues-07-09-2015. 
 52. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 24–25 (6th ed. 2012) (summarizing the structure of U.S. 
intellectual property rights protection).  Federal trade secret protection is a recent 
development; the Defend Trade Secrets Act was signed into law in May of 2016.  
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376; see Eric 
Goldman, The New “Defend Trade Secrets Act” Is the Biggest IP Development in Years, 
FORBES (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/ 
04/28/the-new-defend-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years.  This 
Act provides a federal cause of action for a violation of trade secrets and does not 
supplant state-law-based trade secret regimes; however, the federal law includes an ex 
parte seizure provision that may present a benefit to the federal cause of action.  
Sebastian Kaplan & Patrick Premo, The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Creates Federal 
Jurisdiction for Trade Secret Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (May 23, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/23/defend-trade-secrets-act-2016-creates-fede 
ral-jurisdiction-trade-secret-litigation/id=69245.  There are other forms of state-law-
based intellectual property doctrines, including the right of publicity and various 
contract-based protections.  See generally MERGES ET AL., supra, at 1005–06 (describing 
state law doctrines and how they supplement federal intellectual property regimes). 
 53. Well-known copyright infringement litigation has concerned literary works, 
see, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(addressing author J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter book series); works of the visual arts, 
see, e.g., Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 2–7, Whitmill v. 
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) (concerning 
boxer Mike Tyson’s famous tribal tattoo, which was used without the permission of 
the artist, S. Victor Whitmill, in the film Hangover Part II); and works of musical 
compositions and sound recordings, see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 572–74 (1994) (assessing the parody of Roy Orbison’s hit song “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” in 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman”). 
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trademark protects a company’s image in commerce,54 a trade secret 
protects a company’s secret device or manufacturing process,55 and a 
patent protects an invention.56  On their edges, these bodies of law 
interact and overlap with each other.57 
When issuing a patent, the federal government grants the inventors 
a property right in their inventions.58  This property right grants the 
right to exclude others from “making, using, offering for sale, selling 
or importing the invention[]” within the United States, or importing 
the invention into the United States.59  The USPTO is statutorily 
authorized to issue three types of patents: (1) utility patents, (2) design 
patents, and (3) plant patents.60  The most common type of patent is a 
utility patent, which is granted for novel, useful, and nonobvious 
inventions.61  In contrast, a design patent is granted for “any new, 
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”62  The 
third type of patent, a plant patent, is of much more limited use in that 
                                                          
 54. Notable trademark infringement litigation has concerned Adidas’s famous 
Three-Stripe mark used on a lookalike shoe sold by Payless, see Adidas-Am., Inc. v. 
Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040–43 (D. Or. 2008), and the trade 
dress—the commercial appearance—of taco restaurants, see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765–67 (1992). 
 55. Famous trade secret misappropriation litigation has involved one of DuPont’s 
chemical manufacturing processes, see E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 
431 F.2d 1012, 1013–14 (5th Cir. 1970), and large-scale manufacturing machines, see 
Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24–26, 40 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(rejecting an injunction for trade secrets involving papermaking machinery). 
 56. Prominent patent infringement litigation has included Samuel Morse’s 
invention of the telegram, see O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62–67 (1853), 
and smartphones, see Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1317–19 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 57. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 52, at 25. 
 58. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 11. 
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); see also General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 11. 
 60. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 11.  See generally Types of 
Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offi 
ces/ac/ido/oeip/taf/patdesc.htm (explaining the differences between utility, plant, 
and design patents). 
 61. See Types of Patents, supra note 60; U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 
1963–2015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 15, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web 
/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (showing that utility patents are the USPTO’s 
most issued type of patent).  An example of a utility patent is one issued for a pizza 
box.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,441,626 (filed Dec. 14, 1981) (claiming a patent for 
an improved pizza box). 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
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it is granted to anyone who “invents or discovers and asexually 
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.”63 
There are key differences between a utility patent and a design 
patent.  First, a utility patent protects the way an article—the subject 
matter of the invention or design—functions; a design patent 
protects an article’s aesthetic appearance.64  Second, the term of a 
utility patent is twenty years, while the term of a design patent is 
fourteen or fifteen years.65  Third, although an inventor can file 
multiple claims within a utility patent application, a design patent 
application may only contain one claim.66  Finally, the pendency of 
the prosecution for a utility patent is typically between twenty-five and 
twenty-eight months,67 and the pendency of the prosecution for a 
design patent is typically between seventeen and twenty months;68 
therefore, the pendency of a typical design patent is six months to a 
year shorter than that of a utility patent.  Despite being less common 
than a utility patent, the design patent is gaining popularity and 
proving to be just as valuable in an intellectual property portfolio.69 
Rather than protect the article itself, a design patent protects the 
design “embodied in or applied to an article”; in other words, a 
                                                          
 63. § 161.  An example of a plant patent includes various varieties of corn.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,962,953 (filed May 2, 2013) (claiming “Plants and Seeds of a 
Corn Variety”).  Plant patents are the least common type of patent.  U.S. Patent 
Statistics Chart, supra note 61.  Due to the inherent differences between plant patents 
and design and utility patents, including the lack of an article of manufacture 
requirement, this Comment does not discuss plant patents beyond this introduction. 
 64. MPEP § 1502.01 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 
 65. Id. § 1502.01(A).  The exact term of the design patent depends on the filing 
date:  it is fifteen years if the patent was filed on or after May 13, 2015, and fourteen 
years if filed before that date.  Id. 
 66. Id. § 1502.01(C). 
 67. See Traditional Total Pendency, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/kpis/kpiOverallPendency.kpixml 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2017).  The USPTO defines pendency as “the average number of 
months from the patent application filing date to the date the application has 
reached final disposition (e.g., issued as a patent or abandoned).”  Traditional Total 
Pendency, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.:  DATA VISUALIZATION CTR., 
https://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
 68. See Design Total Pendency, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/kpis/kpi99.kpixml (last updated 
Mar. 2017). 
 69. See Quinn, supra note 12; see also Haydn Shaughnessy, The Surprise Leader in 
Design Patents, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/haydn 
shaughnessy/2013/08/22/the-surprise-leader-in-design-patents (examining the race 
between consumer electronics corporations to accumulate design patent rights). 
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design patent protects the article’s aesthetic appearance.70  Because 
copyright protection is not available for useful articles, Congress 
passed design patent legislation to fill the gap between the copyright 
protection available to artists and the patent protection available to 
inventors.71  Accordingly, design patents protect the creative or 
aesthetic features of a utilitarian product.72  As a result, a designer73 
theoretically could protect the same design by both copyright and 
design patent law.74  However, because the owner of a design patent is 
granted an absolute right to exclude for a period of fourteen years, 
Congress created strict statutory requirements to receive a design 
patent grant from the USPTO.75 
1. A design patent claim 
Unlike utility patents, which may contain multiple claimed 
inventions, the USPTO restricts a design patent to a single claimed 
                                                          
 70. MPEP § 1502; see also Ex parte Cady, 1916 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 62, 63 (stating 
that “[t]he invention is not the article and is not the design per se, but is the design 
applied”); Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, 
COLO. LAW., July 2009, at 71 (discussing the protection granted by a design patent). 
 71. See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.02 (2016) (documenting 
the historical development that led to the design patent act); see also Jason J. Du 
Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107, 111 (2013) 
(providing a thorough dive into the foundational debate over whether to enact 
design patent protection in the United States, and highlighting the holes between 
copyright and utility patent protection at the time design patent protection was 
being considered).  The “useful article doctrine” of copyright law precludes 
copyright protection for industrial designs that are not separable and independent 
from the utilitarian parts of the article.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) 
(reporting Congress’s intent to distinguish between “works of applied art,” which 
receive copyright protection, and industrial designs, which do not receive copyright 
protection, in passing the Copyright Act of 1976). 
 72. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 23.02. 
 73. The word “designer” is used to denote the “inventor” of a design patent, as 
distinguished from an “inventor” of a utility patent. 
 74. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights:  
Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 35, 80–81 (2010) (reviewing the 
overlapping regimes of intellectual property and emphasizing the expanding view of 
protectable subject matter). 
 75. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (enumerating the requirements to receive a design 
patent); MPEP § 1504.01 (reviewing the jurisprudence interpreting the requirements 
of § 171); see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 23.03 (detailing the requirements for 
patenting a design).  The owner of a copyright is given a longer period of protection, 
which is typically the life of the author plus seventy years; however, because of the 
longer period of protection, the right of a copyright owner is not absolute.  MERGES 
ET AL., supra note 52, at 26–27.  The rights of others to use the copyrighted work 
include, among other rights, fair use and independent creation.  Id. 
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design.76  Every patent application, utility or design, includes claims, 
which establish the metes and bounds of the property right granted 
in the patent.77  A patent grants the right to exclude others from 
infringing on the enumerated claims.78  Unlike a utility patent, which 
describes the claimed invention in words, a design patent describes 
the claimed property right through drawings.79  Upon filing an 
application at the USPTO, the designer must submit enough views of 
the design to create “a complete disclosure” of the design’s 
appearance.80  As seen in the examples below, the solid lines of a 
design patent claim constitute the actual ornamental aspects of the 
claimed design, while the dashed lines show the surrounding 
environment, which is not part of the designer’s claim.81 
Designs for both the early version of the iconic Coca-Cola bottle 
(Figure 1) and the Nintendo Game Boy (Figure 2) include only solid 
lines; therefore, the patents claimed the entire ornamental design of the 
bottle and the game.  A third example is the design of a pair of Oakley 
sunglasses (Figure 3), which exemplifies the interplay of the solid and 
dashed lines to show what is and is not claimed by the designer. 
                                                          
 76. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (2012) (stating that “[m]ore than one claim is neither 
required nor permitted”); see also MPEP § 1503.01(III) (outlining that “[a] design 
patent application may only include a single claim”). 
 77. See Quinn, supra note 12 (conveying the basics of patent claims, including the 
interplay between the claims and the specification of the patent). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Under certain circumstances, a design patent application may contain a 
photograph in lieu of a drawing.  See MPEP § 1503.02(V). 
 80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.152; MPEP § 1503.02. 
 81. See MPEP § 1503.02(III); see also Kugler & Mueller, supra note 70, at 75–76 
(discussing the process of patent claiming through drawings for a design patent). 
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conditions and requirements of this title.”87  Because § 171 is subject 
to the “conditions and requirements” of Title 35 of the U.S. Code, 
the Federal Circuit has looked to other sections of that title, such as 
§ 102 and § 103, to interpret its scope.88 
 
a. The relationship between 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 171 
Within Title 35 of the U.S. Code, § 171 for design patents is analogous 
to § 101, which defines the patentable subject matter for a utility 
patent.89  Section 101 reads, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”90 
Section 171 differs in two ways from the statutory requirements to 
receive a utility patent under § 101.  First, § 171 does not use the word 
“useful,” and second, § 171 includes the word “original” to distinguish a 
design from a utility patent.91  In its analysis of the overall structure of 
the design patent statutory scheme, the Federal Circuit has explained 
that the “newness” and “originality” requirements of § 171 import the 
requirements of § 102 (novelty) and § 103 (nonobviousness) because 
§ 171 states that the statutory provision is subject to the “conditions and 
requirements of this title.”92 
b. The novelty, nonobvious, and ornamentality requirements of § 171 
Given this relationship between § 171 and § 101, the first three 
requirements for design patents are relatively straightforward.  First, 
§ 171 requires that the claimed design is novel, which means that no 
                                                          
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 88. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); see also Seymour & Andrew W. Torrance, (R)evolution in Design Patentable 
Subject Matter:  The Shifting Meaning of “Article of Manufacture”, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
183, 187–88 (2013). 
 89. See MPEP § 1502.01 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (distinguishing utility patents 
from design patents). 
 90. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 91. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1238. 
 92. Id.; see also Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 187–88.  According to the 
Federal Circuit, “[t]he originality requirement in § 171 dates back to 1842 when 
Congress enacted the first design patent law.”  Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 
1238.  The court went on to emphasize that § 171 was therefore likely to incorporate 
the originality requirement of copyright law:  “requiring that the work be original 
with the author.”  Id. 
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prior art discloses the same design.93  Prior art is the collection of 
previous designs known to the public as defined by § 102.94  In 
Gorham Co. v. White,95 the Supreme Court outlined the test for design 
novelty—the “ordinary observer” test.96  This test finds a design 
anticipated, or not novel, if an “ordinary observer” could mistake that 
design with another design that preceded it.97 
Second, courts interpret § 171 to require that the design is 
nonobvious, which designers establish by exercising “inventive or 
originative faculty.”98  In International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens 
Corp.,99 the Federal Circuit outlined the two-pronged test for 
nonobviousness.100  In the first prong, one having “ordinary skill in 
the art”101 determines “whether to combine earlier [prior art] 
references to arrive at a single piece of art for comparison with the 
potential design or to modify a single prior art reference.”102  After 
establishing this reference, the finder-of-fact applies the second 
prong by using novelty’s “ordinary observer” test to compare the 
formulated reference from the first prong to the design seeking 
patent protection.103  In other words, after one having ordinary skill 
in the art establishes an objective prior art reference, the finder-of-
fact determines whether an “ordinary observer” would find the 
formulated design substantially similar to the design seeking 
                                                          
 93. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 23.03[5] (outlining the design patent statutory 
requirement of novelty). 
 94. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing, in part, that an inventor may claim a patent 
unless “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date 
of the” patent claim). 
 95. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871). 
 96. Id. at 528. 
 97. See id. (“[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is 
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be 
the other . . . .”). 
 98. Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893). 
 99. 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 100. Id. at 1240. 
 101. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 71, § 5.04A[1] (surveying the contours of patent 
law’s “person having ordinary skill in the art,” including how the “person” is 
formulated); 8 id., § 23.03[6][a]. 
 102. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1240.  By creating this first step in 
establishing nonobviousness, the court implemented a standard that permitted 
objective evidence from expert testimony from designers in the field.  See In re 
Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216–17 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (reviewing the reasoning 
behind the objective determination of one having ordinary skill in the art). 
 103. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1240. 
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protection; if they are found similar, then the design is obvious and 
thus not patentable.104 
Third, the claimed design meets the ornamentality requirement when 
it creates “a more pleasing experience” than the prior art.105  In Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,106 the Supreme Court explained 
that “a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is 
not dictated by function alone.”107  Therefore, some measure of pleasing 
appearance is required to receive a design patent.108  The scope of 
§ 171’s final requirement, however, is not so clear. 
C. The Design Patent Article of Manufacture Requirement of § 171 
The final requirement to receive a design patent is that the design 
is “for an article of manufacture.”109  Over time, Congress has 
modified the text of this requirement within the design patent 
statute, and the courts have expanded their interpretation.110 
1. The changing language of § 171 
The article of manufacture requirement has been part of the 
statute since its initial passage.111  However, through various revisions, 
Congress simplified the text of the requirement.  When originally 
enacted in 1842, the design patent statute granted design patents for 
the following categories: 
 [(1)] any . . . design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other 
material or materials, . . . [(2)] design for the printing of woollen, 
silk, cotton, or other fabrics, . . . [(3)] design for a bust, statute, or 
                                                          
 104. See id. at 1240, 1243–44. 
 105. MERGES ET AL., supra note 52, at 424. 
 106. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 107. Id. at 148.  The Court likely adopted this position from the predecessor to the 
Federal Circuit, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), which 
described the requirement as met when a design “possess[ed] more grace and pleasing 
appearance” than a prior art.  In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1930). 
 108. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148; Koehring, 37 F.2d at 422 (clarifying that the 
pleasing appearance is not confined to the beauty in the “aesthetics or fine arts”).  
But see Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 189 (quoting Contico Int’l, Inc. v. 
Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 1981)) (arguing 
that the ornamentality requirement that the Supreme Court set in Bonito Boats has 
been abandoned by the lower courts, including the Federal Circuit, and that some 
courts have held that the design must merely be considered “not ugly . . . when 
compared to prior designs”). 
 109. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 110. See infra Sections I.C.1–2 (explaining the shifting language of § 171 and how 
courts interpret that language). 
 111. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544. 
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bas relief or composition in alto or basso relievo, or [(4)] any . . . 
impression or ornament, or . . . [(5)] any . . . pattern, or print, or 
picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or 
painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture, 
or [(6)] any . . . shape or configuration of any article of 
manufacture not known or used by others . . . .112 
Subsequently, Congress revised the statute in 1870 to include the 
following subject matters: 
 [(1)] design for a manufacture, bust, statue, alto-relievo, or bas-
relief; . . . [(2)] design for the printing of wool[l]en, silk, cotton, or 
other fabrics; . . . [(3)] impression, ornament, pattern print, or 
picture, to be printed, painted, cast, or otherwise placed on or 
worked into any article of manufacture; or . . . [(4)] shape or 
configuration of any article of manufacture . . . .113 
Ultimately, in 1902, Congress arrived at the statute’s current 
wording by amending the statute to read solely “design for an article 
of manufacture.”114  At the time, the USPTO interpreted the change 
as a simplification of the language of the statute and not as a 
limitation of the previous enumeration of patentable subjects.115  
Although amended twice more in 1939 and 1952, the design patent 
statute’s wording of the article of manufacture requirement has 
stayed the same.116 
2. Early court interpretations of § 171 
While design patents initially protected smaller, tangible items, 
such as statues and industrial designs,117 in the early twentieth 
century, the courts began to interpret the article of manufacture 
requirement more broadly.  In In re Hadden,118 the Court of Appeals 
                                                          
 112. Id.; see also In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (describing the 
original design patent statute). 
 113. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 210; see also Schnell, 46 F.2d at 
205 (quoting the 1870 Act). 
 114. Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193, 193; see also Seymour & Torrance, 
supra note 88, at 192 (indicating that when Congress amended the 1902 Act, the 
legislature simplified the language for the patentability requirements). 
 115. See Schnell, 46 F.2d at 205 (“Congress did not, in amending the act in 1902, 
intend to omit as proper subjects for a design patent—any new and original 
impression, ornament, patent, print, or picture to be printed, painted, cast, or 
otherwise placed on or worked into any article of manufacture.” (quoting Ex parte 
Fulda, 1913 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 206, 207)). 
 116. Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 192. 
 117. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543, 544 (including protection for, inter 
alia, a “design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or composition in alto or basso relievo”). 
 118. 20 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1927). 
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for the District of Columbia (now known as the D.C. Circuit) faced a 
novel question on appeal from the USPTO:  whether a designer may 
claim a patent for a life-sized grandstand.119  The USPTO had decided 
that the grandstand, while a “manufacture” within the meaning of the 
utility patent statute, was not an “article of manufacture” within the 
meaning of the design patent statute; it cautioned that an observer 
would not be aware of the grandstand’s ornamental features because 
of its size and immobility.120  However, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the 
USPTO’s distinction between a “manufacture” and an “article of 
manufacture,” finding it nearly impossible to distinguish between the 
two.121  The court ultimately incorporated the accepted meaning of 
“manufacture” from the utility patent statute into the design patent 
statute’s article of manufacture requirement.122  The court’s holding 
that size and immobility are not dispositive characteristics thus 
broadened the term’s accepted meaning.123 
Shifting away from the tangible, typical design, in In re Hruby124 the 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) interpreted the 
scope of an article of manufacture to include the ornamental display 
of a fountain.125  During examination at the USPTO, the designer 
claimed the following fountain: 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 275. 
 120. Id. at 275–76. 
 121. Id. at 276. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (citing Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699, 702 (3d Cir. 1913)). 
 124. 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 125. Id. at 998–99. 
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Second, the court reaffirmed the holding in Hadden that size and 
immobility do not create unpatentable subject matter.132  Finally, the 
court rejected the argument that the water sprays did not constitute 
an article of manufacture because they could not “exist of 
themselves.”133  Specifically, the CCPA held that “the dependence of 
the existence of a design on something outside itself is [not] a reason 
for holding it is not a design ‘for an article of manufacture.’”134  The 
court emphasized that many designs depend on outside factors for 
their outward appearance.135  Thus, the CCPA held that under the 
design patent statute, an “article of manufacture” might be intangible 
and dependent upon another object.  This was the last time that the 
CCPA or its successor, the Federal Circuit, heard a case that required 
a plain text interpretation of § 171’s article of manufacture 
requirement; however, following the advent of computers, the 
USPTO had to consider whether software icons were within the scope 
of the requirement.136 
3. Design patent protection and software 
Design patents and software had their first encounter at the 
USPTO as companies began to create and use software icons.137  In 
the 1980s, computer-generated graphics and icons burgeoned onto 
the design scene.138  Around the same time, the Xerox Corporation 
(“Xerox”) broke new ground at the USPTO by filing design patent 
applications for its computer icons.139  Ultimately, the USPTO issued 
Xerox design patent protection based on some of its initial 
                                                          
 132. Id. at 1000 (reaffirming Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699 (3d Cir. 
1913), the basis of the Hadden court’s holding); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 118–23 (detailing the CCPA’s reasoning for its holding in Hadden). 
 133. Hruby, 373 F.2d at 1001. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Examples of designs that depend on outside factors for their ultimate 
appearance include (1) a lampshade dependent upon the lightbulb being turned 
on; (2) a woman’s hosiery dependent upon a woman’s legs; (3) inflated articles, such 
as balloons, air mattresses, and pool floats; and (4) wallpaper that requires being 
placed on the wall for a full understanding of the design.  Id. 
 136. See Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 203–04 (detailing the USPTO’s 
extension of design patent grants to software icons). 
 137. Id. at 200. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Lance L. Vietzke, Software as the Article of Manufacture in Design Patents for Icons, 
21 AIPLA Q.J. 138, 146 (1993). 
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computer system.”148  Further, to pass the § 171 article of 
manufacture requirement, Xerox identified the computer as the 
article of manufacture.149  The examiner ultimately rejected the 
application because it did not include a depiction or description of 
the computer itself in the application.150  On appeal from the 
examiner, the Board upheld the rejection.151  The Board explained 
that merely presenting a picture on a computer’s display does not 
constitute a protectable design; rather, it is solely because “the icon is 
an integral part of the operation of a programmed computer” that 
the potential for patentability exists.152 
Although the Board’s view in Strijland withstood opposition at the 
USPTO, subsequent challengers chipped away at its stronghold.  In 
Ex parte Tayama,153 the Board appeared open to expanding protection 
to software icons.154  The designer claimed the “ornamental design 
                                                          
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1265. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1261.  The Board also used the same reasoning in Ex parte Donaldson, 
No. 92-0546, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1250, 1251 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 2, 1992).  In both 
opinions, the Board repeats large portions of text, further evidencing that these cases 
were decided simultaneously.  Compare, e.g., Donaldson, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1257 (“The 
phrase ‘design for an article of manufacture’ has long appeared in the design 
statutes.”), with Strijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1261 (same). 
A simplified explanation of the USPTO appeals process is as follows:  Upon an 
adverse decision on patentability from an examiner, the appellee must file a notice 
of appeal and submit an appeal brief to the Board.  Appeals, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-
and-appeal-board/appeals.  The examiner who reviewed the initial application then 
files an answer to the Board.  Id.  Upon review of the briefs, and after an oral 
hearing, if granted, the Board issues its decision.  Id.  For a more detailed overview of 
the ex parte appeals process at the USPTO, see William F. Smith, An Overview of Ex 
Parte Patent Appeals in the USPTO, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/PTABBenchAndBar2016/PTAB%202016%20
Bench%20%20Bar%20Conference/Walters_Paper.pdf. 
 152. Strijland, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1263. 
 153. No. 1992-0624, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 2, 1992). 
 154. Specifically, the Board indicated that software icons might fall within the 
scope of the article of manufacture requirement: 
We have no doubt that the claimed design, like all surface ornamentation-
type designs, could be used to ornament a wide variety of articles, including 
computers.  However, the phrase “design for an article of manufacture” in  
§ 171 requires more than a depiction of the surface ornamentation alone.  It 
requires disclosure of the ornamentation applied to or embodied in an 
article of manufacture.  More than an applicant’s generalized intent to 
ornament some article is required.  It is the application of the design to an 
article which separates mere pictures from a design protectable by a patent.  
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for an icon for set up operation,”155 arguing that the icon was “surface 
ornamentation upon a computer system.”156  This line of argument 
aimed to establish the computer as the article of manufacture 
required by § 171.157  In accord with the logic in Strijland, the Board 
upheld the rejection because the specification failed to “show or 
describe” Tayama’s “claimed design embodied in any article of 
manufacture.”158  Again, the Board reiterated that “a picture standing 
alone is not protectable by a design patent.”159  However, similar to 
Strijland, the Board hinted that if Tayama had included the computer 
in the application, the icon may have been patentable.160 
After witnessing the failures of Xerox, attorneys used the CCPA’s 
holding in Hruby to analogize to the characteristics of Hruby’s 
fountain to those of a software icon.  In Ex parte Donoghue,161 the 
designer injected the logic of the Hruby court—which held that 
dependency, ephemerality, and permanence do not preclude design 
patentability—to argue to the Board that the icon design depended 
upon the computer system that did not need to be disclosed in the 
application.162  The Board rejected this argument, distinguishing the 
claimed icon as a claim of surface ornamentation and the fountain in 
Hruby as an applied design.163  Because an icon is a form of surface 
ornamentation, the ornamentation must, to receive a design patent, 
be applied to an article of manufacture; Donoghue failed to do so in 
her application.164 
                                                          
Without disclosure of an article, the design is not an applied design 
contemplated for protection under § 171. 
Id. at 1617. 
 155. Id. at 1615 n.2. 
 156. Id. at 1617. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1616. 
 160. See id. at 1616–17. 
 161. No. 92-0539, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 2, 1992). 
 162. Id. at 1270. 
 163. Id.  The Board explained the difference between an abstract design and an 
applied design: 
 While the design must be embodied in some article, the statute is not limited 
to designs for complete articles, or ‘discrete’ articles, and certainly not to 
articles separately sold. . . .  Here the design is embodied in the shank 
portion of a drill and a drill is unquestionably an article of manufacture.  It is 
thus applied design as distinguished from abstract design. 
Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
 164. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.152 to emphasize the requirement that the designer 
discloses the article of manufacture to which the design is applied). 
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Following the Board’s decisions in Strijland, Tayama, and Donoghue, 
the USPTO changed course by expanding design patent protection to 
software icons and by publishing interim guidelines for examining 
design patent applications for software icons.165  In response to the 
Board’s concern, the interim guidelines required the designer to 
include solid lines around the software icon to represent the computer’s 
display, thereby ensuring compliance with the article of manufacture 
requirement.166  In 1996, the USPTO finalized its regulations, which are 
now incorporated into the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(MPEP) and permit the computer display to be illustrated by either solid 
or dashed lines.167  Within the MPEP, the USPTO cites Hruby to justify 
the broadening of the article of manufacture requirement to include 
software icons.168  According to the MPEP, “[t]he dependence of a 
computer-generated icon on a central processing unit and computer 
program for its existence itself is not a reason for holding that the design 
is not for an article of manufacture.”169  At issue in Strijland, Tayama, and 
Donoghue was whether the claimed icon should be viewed as a claim of 
surface ornamentation or an actual applied design, like the fountain in 
Hruby; however, the USPTO dropped this distinction seemingly without 
any explanation.170  Even after the issue of the article of manufacture 
requirement has been raised in cases before the Board, and ultimately 
addressed in the MPEP, the Federal Circuit has never heard the 
question of the scope of design patent eligibility under § 171.171 
4. The Federal Circuit’s modern interpretation of the article of manufacture 
requirement 
Although the Federal Circuit has not ruled on the USPTO’s broad 
interpretation of § 171’s article of manufacture requirement, the court 
                                                          
 165. See Interim Guidelines for Examination of Design Patent Applications for 
Computer-Generated Icons, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,170 (Oct. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Interim 
Guidelines]; see also Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 204 (emphasizing that 
the USPTO “abruptly changed” its design patent application review policy). 
 166. Interim Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. at 52,170. 
 167. Guidelines for Examination of Design Patent Applications for Computer-
Generated Icons, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,381 (Mar. 20, 1996); see also MPEP 
§ 1504.01(a) (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008). 
 168. See MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I)(A) (citing In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1001 
(C.C.P.A. 1967)). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id.; see also Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 205 (highlighting that 
neither the guidelines nor the MPEP explain why the distinction was “abandoned”). 
 171. Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 203–04 (pointing out the absence of 
an appeal to the Federal Circuit).  For a discussion of more recent district court cases 
on software icons, see id. at 205–06. 
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has heard at least two cases interpreting similar “manufacture” 
requirements in related statutes.  The first case, In re Nuijten,172 involved 
the scope of utility patent subject matter under § 101 and was decided in 
2007;173 the second case, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade 
Commission,174 involved the jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)175 and was decided in 
2015 with its en banc rehearing denied in March 2016.176 
In Nuijten, the Federal Circuit decided that a “watermarked” signal 
does not constitute subject matter for a utility patent, consequently 
falling outside the scope of § 101.177  Watermarking is a technique 
that embeds an electronic signal with additional data.178  For 
example, the watermarking technique is used on digital audio files to 
prevent unauthorized copying.179  The inventor attempted to patent 
four types of claims relating to the watermarked signals: (1) the 
process, (2) the device that performs the process, (3) the storage 
medium that holds the resulting signals, and (4) the signals 
themselves.180  The USPTO granted the first three categories of 
                                                          
 172. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 173. Id. at 1348. 
 174. 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (per curiam). 
 175. Id. at 1286.  The ITC “is an independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with 
broad investigative responsibilities on matters of trade.”  About the USITC, U.S. INT’L 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2017).  Though vital in enforcing a patent-owner’s rights against potential 
international infringers, specific workings of the ITC and its special remedies are 
outside the scope of this Comment.  This Comment looks to the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the term “manufacture” as used within § 337 of the ITC’s 
controlling statute. 
 176. ClearCorrect, 819 F.3d at 1334, 1337. 
 177. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), which expanded the 
Court’s § 101 subject matter test from Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), to software patents, it is unclear how the Court 
would treat the watermarked electronic signal in Nuijten.  The two-step framework to 
evaluate patentable subject matter under § 101 has created significant uncertainty in the 
software world.  See Rajit Kapur et al., Certain Uncertainty:  The Future of Computer Software 
Patents, BANNER & WITCOFF:  IP UPDATE (Fall/Winter 2015), 
http://documents.lexology.com/23c2aaab-8c47-4964-910a-6bb69dd13809.pdf. 
Certain-Uncertainty.The-Future-of-Computer-Software-Patents.pdf.  The court’s analysis 
in Nuijten, despite being decided seven years prior to Alice, still sheds light on how the 
court may analyze three-dimensional digital models because the subject matter of 
Nuijten involved a manipulated electronic signal.  See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348. 
 178. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1351. 
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claims and rejected the fourth claim—the actual watermarked 
signal.181  First, the Board found that the signal had no “physical 
attributes,” and the claim solely described its abstract 
characteristics.182  Second, the signal did not fall into any of the four 
categories of patentable subject matter outlined in § 101—“process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”183  Third, the 
Board found that the signal was not a tangible object and thus failed 
to meet the definition of “manufacture.”184 
In its analysis, the court dealt with the first ground of the Board’s 
rejection, ruling that the claim should be construed as claiming the 
signal itself.185  The court found that the signal had physical attributes 
and thus was not a claim for solely the abstract characteristics of the 
signal.186  Next, the court turned to an analysis of whether the signal 
fit into the statutory subject matter of § 101.187  After rejecting the 
signal as either a process or a machine, the court turned its attention 
to the category of a manufacture.188  Upon facing this difficult 
question, the court examined the Supreme Court’s landmark case 
interpreting the breadth of § 101, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,189 for 
guidance on the meaning of “manufacture.”190  In Chakrabarty, the 
Court interpreted the term “manufacture” (in its verb form) very 
broadly, citing legislative history and Congress’s use of broad 
language as evidence that Congress recognized that some “inventions 
are often unforeseeable.”191  In Nuijten, however, the Federal Circuit 
construed “manufacture” as a noun rather than a verb and defined 
the term using the same dictionary the Supreme Court used in 
Chakrabarty.192  Ultimately, the court equated “manufacture,” used in 
                                                          
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1351–52. 
 183. Id. at 1352 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1353 (quoting Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 
F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (“The view that there is nothing necessarily 
physical about ‘signals’ is incorrect.”). 
 186. Id. (explaining that a “signal” transports information via some physical carrier). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1356. 
 189. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 190. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356. 
 191. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09, 316 (citing the history of the first Patent Act, 
including thoughts of the author, Thomas Jefferson, that defined statutory subject 
matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new or useful improvement” (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 
318, 319)). 
 192. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356. 
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noun form, to an “article of manufacture,” and found that the term 
referred to “tangible articles or commodities.”193  Subsequently, while 
finding the signal physical, the court held that, as defined by the 
claim, the signals did not comprise a tangible article.194  Thus, the 
court found that the claimed signals did not meet the meaning of 
“manufacture” in § 101.195 
In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Linn raised the issue of a 
potential contradiction of the majority’s interpretation of 
“manufacture” in Nuijten with the CCPA’s previous interpretation of 
“article of manufacture” in Hruby.196  Attempting to elucidate the 
potential contradiction, the majority distinguished Nuijten from Hruby 
in a footnote, emphasizing that this interpretation of “article of 
manufacture” was limited to a utility patent under § 101 and that this 
case did not affect the “article of manufacture” for the patentability 
of designs under § 171.197 
The Federal Circuit returned to the term “article” in ClearCorrect, 
interpreting the phrase within 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) to determine 
whether the ITC had jurisdiction.198  This case dealt with importing 
three-dimensional digital models of orthodontic aligners.199  Align 
Technology, Inc. (“Align”) alleged that ClearCorrect Operating 
(“ClearCorrect”) violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (“section 337”) on a 
theory of patent infringement.200  The orthodontic aligners at issue 
were designed to incrementally reposition a patient’s teeth.201  
ClearCorrect scanned patients’ teeth in the United States and sent 
the three-dimensional models to its Pakistan office, which then 
created the incremental positioning scheme for the teeth.202  After 
                                                          
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1357. 
 196. See id. at 1358, 1360 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing 
that a “signal” is not necessarily transitory and “may last indefinitely”). 
 197. Id. at 1357 n.9 (majority opinion). 
 198. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286 
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) 
(disagreeing with “[t]he Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its 
jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data”). 
 199. Id. at 1287. 
 200. Id.  During the litigation, Align alleged infringement of various claims over 
seven different patents:  (1) U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325; (2) U.S. Patent No. 6,705,863; 
(3) U.S. Patent No. 6,626,666; (4) U.S. Patent No. 8,070,487; (5) U.S. Patent No. 
6,471,511; (6) U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880; and (7) U.S. Patent No. 7,134,874.  Id. at 
1287 n.3. 
 201. Id. at 1287. 
 202. Id. 
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the positioning scheme was complete, the Pakistan office sent the 
three-dimensional models back to the United States, where 
employees subsequently printed the models to use to mold the 
orthodontic aligners.203  As set by section 337, the ITC’s jurisdiction is 
limited to “unfair acts” involving the “importation of articles.”204  
Thus, to establish jurisdiction, the ITC had to determine that the 
three-dimensional digital models constituted an “article” within the 
meaning of section 337.  Accordingly, the ITC determined that the 
use of “articles” within section 337 included digital data.205 
The Federal Circuit reversed the ITC and held that the meaning of 
“articles” only extends to “material things” and thus does not extend 
to three-dimensional digital models.206  To determine the meaning of 
“articles,” the court walked through four phases of statutory analysis:  
first, construing the term in its ordinary meaning; second, turning to 
the term’s use throughout section 337; third, looking at the full 
statutory scheme; and fourth, examining the statute’s legislative 
history.207  In the first phase of analysis, the court surveyed numerous 
dictionaries contemporaneous to the passage of section 337’s 
predecessor in which Congress initially used the phrase “articles.”208  
Upon review of the dictionaries, the court maintained that “articles” 
meant solely material things, and the term did not extend to 
intangible articles.209  Consequently, the court concluded that an 
“article” did not include electronically transmitted three-dimensional 
digital models.210  In the second phase, the court found that the 
structure of section 337 reinforced the conclusion that Congress 
                                                          
 203. Id. 
 204. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1298–99 
(addressing the boundaries of the ITC’s jurisdiction by examining the legislative 
history of the Tariff Act). 
 205. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1299 (discussing the ITC’s argument “that the use 
of the word ‘commerce’ indicates that ‘articles’ should be read broadly”); see also 
Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 4555 (May 6, 2013) (Final) 
(recommending the issue of cease and desist orders to ClearCorrect concerning six 
infringed patents of Align). 
 206. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1290. 
 207. See id. at 1290–99. 
 208. See id. at 1291–94. 
 209. Id. at 1293–94. 
 210. See id. (emphasizing that it is “clear that the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘articles’ is ‘material things’”).  The court surveyed a total of eleven dictionaries 
during this discussion; these dictionaries included the contemporaneous edition of 
Webster’s at the time the 1922 Tariff Act was passed, industry specific dictionaries, 
and various editions of Black’s Law Dictionary.  See id. at 1291–93, 1298–99. 
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intended for “articles” to mean material things.211  Here, the court 
focused on the exclusionary purpose of section 337.212  Because the 
purpose of the act is to prevent items that infringe intellectual 
property from entering the United States, the fact that it was 
impracticable to stop electronic transmission would make the statute 
unenforceable.213  As a result of this analysis, the court rejected 
Align’s invitation to read section 337 broadly enough to encompass 
electronic signals.214 
The third and fourth phases of analysis continued along the same 
lines as the initial two.  In the third phase of its statutory analysis, the 
court found no help in the statutory scheme to include a digital 
model within the meaning of an article.215  Whether considering 
exclusion orders, cease and desist orders, or tariff schedules, the court 
concluded that each was directed at the regulation of material things 
and not the transmission of digital data.216  Finally, the court examined 
the legislative history of section 337.217  In its decision below, the ITC 
posited that, because Congress used a variety of words to describe 
“articles,” the legislative history indicated that the word should be read 
more broadly than “material things.”218  However, the court emphasized 
that Congress “unambiguously” intended that the meaning of “articles” 
only extend to “material things.”219  The court ultimately concluded 
that Congress, rather than the ITC, was in a better position to 
determine what should be included in the statute as an “article.”220 
In a vehement dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority’s 
holding was contrary to the purpose of section 337 and conflicted 
                                                          
 211. Id. at 1294 (rationalizing that “if ‘articles’ had a broader definition, 
numerous subsections would be rendered inoperative”). 
 212. See id. at 1295. 
 213. Id. (“By way of example, digital transmissions from satellites do not move 
through border crossings, nor can they be stopped at our borders via any 
enforcement mechanism contemplated in the statutory scheme.”). 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 1296–98. 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. at 1298. 
 218. See id. at 1298–99.  The ITC pointed out that the words “goods” and 
“commerce” were used synonymously with the word “articles” within the legislative 
history.  Id. 
 219. Id. at 1299 (determining that “articles” does not encompass “electronically 
transmitted digital data”). 
 220. Id. at 1302.  To determine the appropriate deference to give the ITC, the court 
performed the two-step analysis as outlined in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).  ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1290, 1299–1300.  
The court determined it owed no deference to the ITC’s findings.  Id. at 1301–02. 
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with binding precedent and other judicial bodies.221  She submitted 
that the Information Age changed the technology world and that, to 
serve its statutory purpose, section 337 needed to evolve to facilitate 
remedies against modern unfair competition.222  Judge Newman 
emphasized that section 337 was meant to apply “to all patented 
technologies, including digital technologies, whatever the path of 
importation.”223  Further, she rejected the tangible limitation on 
“articles” within the meaning of section 337,224 contending that 
Congress could not have intended to omit future technologies it 
could not foresee when it enacted the statute as well as the majority’s 
read-in limitation.225 
Following their defeat, Align and the ITC each filed petitions for 
an en banc rehearing; both petitions were denied.226  However, the 
panel’s split, and its fervor, persisted in the denial of the en banc 
petition for a rehearing.227 
II. VIRTUAL AND AUGMENTED REALITY:  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S 
CRASH COURSE WITH THE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE NEED FOR A BROAD 
INTERPRETATION OF § 171 
The maturity and rapid growth of the VR and AR markets are 
blurring the lines between the physical and digital words, and more 
designers in these markets will seek design patent protection.  
Therefore, whether a three-dimensional digital model constitutes an 
“article of manufacture” within the meaning of § 171 is likely to 
become a much-debated topic.  Congress’s simplification of the 
                                                          
 221. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This holding is 
contrary to Section 337, and conflicts with rulings of the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of International Trade, 
the International Trade Commission, the Customs authorities, and the Department 
of Labor.”). 
 222. See id. 
 223. Id. at 1307. 
 224. Id. at 1308 (“Unquestionably, Congress meant . . . to include under the word 
‘articles’ any provided-for substance, material or thing of whatever kind or character 
that was imported into this country.” (quoting United States v. Eimer & Amend, 28 
C.C.P.A. 10, 12 (1940))). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (denying en banc rehearing). 
 227. See id. at 1337 (Newman, J., dissenting).  After the Federal Circuit issued its 
adverse decision, Align and the ITC chose not to seek certiorari at the Supreme 
Court.  Kirk Sigmon et al., ClearCorrect v. ITC:  No Supreme Court Review, MORRISON & 
FOERSTER LLP:  MOFO @ ITC (Sept. 7, 2016), http://mofoatitc.mofo.com/federal-
circuit-decisions-re-itc/clearcorrect-v-itc-no-supreme-court-review. 
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statutory text of § 171 and the CCPA’s and USPTO’s most recent 
direct interpretations of § 171’s article of manufacture requirement 
support a broad interpretation of the phrase “an article of 
manufacture” that includes three-dimensional digital models.228  
Based on this interpretation, the USPTO should grant design patents 
to three-dimensional digital models.229  In two recent cases, however, 
the Federal Circuit has signaled a narrowing of the scope of the 
“article of manufacture” language and has explicitly excluded 
electronic and digital technologies.230  While the court arguably 
respects the plain language meaning of these terms at the time 
Congress enacted these statutes, its refusal to expand the scope of the 
article of manufacture requirement does so at the expense of 
congressional intent evidenced by the design patent statute’s 
legislative history. 
A. The Federal Circuit Has Signaled a Limitation on Statutory Subject 
Matter by Adopting a Narrow Meaning of an “Article of Manufacture” in a 
Statute Related to the Design Patent Statute 
In its two most recent decisions interpreting the phrase “article of 
manufacture,” the Federal Circuit has signaled a much narrower view 
than that held by its predecessor court—the CCPA—and the 
USPTO.231  In Nuijten, the court indicated that it holds a narrow view 
of the definition of an article of manufacture.232  In ClearCorrect, the 
Federal Circuit confirmed this view, holding the same limited view of 
                                                          
 228. See infra Sections II.A–B (explaining the furtherance of an inclusive subject 
matter policy in § 171 of the design patent statute from overall simplification of the 
article of manufacture requirement, legislative history, and case law). 
 229. See infra Section II.C. 
 230. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1299 (refusing to include three-dimensional 
digital models within the meaning of an “article of manufacture”); In re Nuijten, 500 
F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing to include watermarked electronic signals 
within the meaning of an “article of manufacture”); infra Section II.A 
(acknowledging the Federal Circuit’s limited holding of “articles of manufacture” to 
the physical realm). 
 231. See In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1001–02 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (finding a broad view 
of an article of manufacture); MPEP § 1504.01(a) (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) 
(permitting design patents for software icons); see also infra Sections II.C.2–3 
(discussing the change in the USPTO and courts’ interpretation of an article of 
manufacture). 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 186–95 (identifying the Federal Circuit’s 
limitation of the definition of “manufacture” when analyzing whether a watermarked 
electronic signal is patentable subject matter under § 101). 
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an article of manufacture as in Nuijten.233  Further, ClearCorrect 
continues to evince the court’s willingness to limit the definition of 
an article of manufacture to the physical world.234 
1. The narrow definition of “manufacture” in In re Nuijten 
The Federal Circuit departed from a broad reading of the article of 
manufacture requirement in Nuijten.235  In Nuijten, the court 
narrowed the definition of a “manufacture” in its interpretation of 
§ 101, the same statutory provision that the Supreme Court 
interpreted in Chakrabarty.236  Because it interpreted “manufacture” in 
§ 101 to be a noun, the court denied patent protection for a 
watermarked electrical signal because the signal was “fleeting”; 
“devoid of any semblance of permanence”; and dependent on a 
machine to be “perceived.”237  Given the close relationship between 
§ 101 and § 171 and the Federal Circuit’s willingness to import 
meanings derived from the utility patent statute into the design 
patent statute, the court could import the narrowed meaning of 
manufacture into its interpretation of § 171.238 
The characteristics of Nuijten’s electronic signal that the court 
identified as precluding utility patentability are similar to the 
characteristics of the Hruby fountain, which the CCPA upheld as 
patentable.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit described Nuijten’s 
electronic signal as “fleeting,” “devoid of any semblance of 
permanence,” and dependent on a machine to be “perceived,”239 
while the CCPA described the particles that made up Hruby’s 
fountain as “fleeting,” and found that the fountain itself lacked 
“permanence” and was “dependen[t]” on the flow of water.240  
Despite these similar characteristics, however, the two courts did not 
                                                          
 233. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the court’s determination that a three-
dimensional model did not meet the definition of “article” under the statute). 
 234. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1286 (concluding that “articles” means “material 
things” and that any expansion of this interpretation should be left to Congress). 
 235. See supra Section I.C.4 (providing an overview of the Federal Circuits decision 
in Nuijten and emphasizing the court’s departure from the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of patentable subject matter set by § 101). 
 236. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 237. See id. at 1356–57; supra text accompanying notes 190–93 (explaining the 
decision to read “manufacture” as a noun rather than a verb to narrow the definition 
of the term). 
 238. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (noting that courts have interpreted the requirements of design patents in 
line with those of utility patents). 
 239. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356–57. 
 240. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
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come to the same conclusions.  While the CCPA in Hruby held that 
tangibility, dependence, and permanence did not preclude a design 
from patentability, the Federal Circuit in Nuijten held that these 
characteristics did preclude patentability.241 
Judge Linn, in his concurrence and dissent in Nuijten, pointed out the 
inconsistency of the Federal Circuit’s decision to interpret the word 
“manufacture” in the utility patent context differently than it had in the 
design patent context in Hruby.242  He stated that, “In In re Hruby, we 
held that it was not the dynamic position of any given water droplet, but 
rather the overall pattern, that was patentable; likewise, here, it is the 
overall signal, not the physical manifestation of a single bit, that 
constitutes the invention.”243  To counter Judge Linn’s point, the 
majority argued that because requirements for patentability differed in 
the utility and design realms, there would not be a contradiction issue.244  
Nevertheless, the court appears to ignore the fact that the requirements 
for patentability—novelty, obviousness, and subject matter—are 
independent from each other.245  Consequently, because the design and 
utility patent statutes have an independent subject matter requirement 
that includes the word “manufacture,” it is immaterial to point out that 
there are other, dissimilar requirements.246  The court’s jurisprudence, 
which imports utility patent concepts and interpretations into the design 
patent statute, further underscores the argument that the limited 
meaning of “manufacture” could likely be imported into the 
interpretation of § 171.247 
Because of § 171’s language subjecting it to other “conditions and 
requirements” of Title 35, the Federal Circuit has freely imported the 
statutory interpretation of utility patent requirements into the 
                                                          
 241. See id. at 999–1001; supra text accompanying notes 128–35 (examining the 
CCPA’s reasoning for not finding these factors dispositive in determining whether a 
design was patentable under § 171). 
 242. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1360 (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 243. Id. (citation omitted). 
 244. Id. at 1357 n.9 (majority opinion) (“Hruby dealt with a 35 U.S.C. § 171 design 
patent for an aesthetically pleasing water fountain rather than a § 101 utility patent, 
and is therefore of limited applicability to this case.  The subject of a design patent 
need not have any practical utility. Compare § 101 (‘new and useful’), with § 171 
(‘new . . . and ornamental’).”). 
 245. See Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 199 (identifying the inconsistency 
between the majority’s statement in footnote nine and the statutory requirements for 
design patentability). 
 246. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 171 (2012); Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 199. 
 247. See supra Section I.B.2.a (identifying the courts’ willingness to import utility 
patent statutory provisions into interpretations of design patent law). 
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requirements for design patentability.248  Thus, given the similarity of 
the wording between the subject matter requirements for design and 
utility patents, the design patent statute’s grant permitting the 
importation of utility patent requirements, and the court’s history of 
actually importing these requirements, it is extremely likely that, 
given the invitation, the Federal Circuit would import Nuijten’s 
manufacture requirement into the design patent statute.  This 
importation would necessarily overturn Hruby.249 
There are many similarities between the watermarked signal in 
Nuijten and a three-dimensional digital model used in VR and AR 
technologies.  Both three-dimensional digital models and 
watermarked signals are purely electronic, exist temporarily, and 
depend on some other device to exist.250  Thus, assuming the court 
would not distinguish an electronic signal and a three-dimensional 
digital model, a three-dimensional model would fail to be patentable 
if the court imported the interpretation of a manufacture from 
Nuijten into the meaning of design patent’s § 171. 
2. The Federal Circuit’s adherence to the limited definition of “manufacture” 
in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission 
In ClearCorrect, its most recent opinion interpreting the phrase 
“article of manufacture,” the Federal Circuit maintained its narrow 
view from Nuijten.251  The dental models in ClearCorrect are the closest 
analogous subject matter to the types of digital models that are found 
in the VR and AR worlds.252  Through its analysis, the court 
undertook a lengthy, four-part statutory interpretation, ultimately 
resulting in a narrow definition of the word “articles” that excluded 
                                                          
 248. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (importing legal holdings from utility patent law). 
 249. See infra Section II.C.1 (describing how the decision in Hruby would permit a 
three-dimensional digital model to be considered an article of manufacture). 
 250. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (outlining the 
characteristics of a watermarked signal); supra text accompanying notes 242–47 
(emphasizing that the reasons the Federal Circuit found the watermarked electronic 
signal to not be patentable were almost identical to the reasons that the CCPA, the 
Federal Circuit’s predecessor, rejected as dispositive for design patentability). 
 251. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302 
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 
 252. The three-dimensional models at issue in ClearCorrect were actual scans of a 
patient’s teeth.  See id. at 1286–87; supra text accompanying notes 201–03.  These 
scans were accurate enough to be 3D printed into physical models, underscoring the 
detail of the model.  See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1287.  Because of the quality, these 
models are very similar to VR and AR three-dimensional digital models. 
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three-dimensional digital models.253  However, the court was not 
unanimous:  Judge Newman wrote a vigorous dissent in that case and 
also dissented to the denial of a rehearing en banc.254  Still, the 
majority’s limited definition of an article of manufacture was 
consistent with the narrow view outlined in Nuijten, ultimately 
showing that the court would continue to adhere to the 
interpretation excluding digital media.255 
The court in ClearCorrect interpreted the Section 337 use of 
“articles” as limited to tangible, material things; however, the analysis 
strictly adhered to the understanding of technology and products of 
the early twentieth century.  The court unnecessarily restricted itself 
to a century-old understanding of the meaning of “articles” as 
outlined in dictionaries and tariff schedules.256  As a result, the court 
ignored Congress’s intent in passing the statute, which was to provide 
an additional safeguard against unfair competition by imports; 
instead, the court focused on the practicability of enforcing a ban on 
importation of intangible, digital media.257  With the emphasis on 
tangibility, it is unsurprising that dictionaries from the early twentieth 
century supported the court’s narrow view; the advancement of 
electronic and digital technologies, which expanded society’s 
awareness of intangible commerce, was obviously unforeseen at that 
time.258  Underscoring this point, as Judge Newman emphasized in 
her dissent, the Supreme Court has held that when interpreting 
statutes that were passed before the Information Age, the courts 
“must read the statutory language . . . in the light of drastic 
technological change.”259  When read in this light, courts should 
apply a broader view of the term “articles,” which would include 
three-dimensional digital models. 
                                                          
 253. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1299. 
 254. Id. at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting); ClearCorrect, 819 F.3d at 1337; see also text 
accompanying notes 221–25 (reviewing Judge Newman’s dissent including her belief 
that the court was departing from prior rulings of numerous judicial and 
administrative bodies). 
 255. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1302; Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357. 
 256. See supra note 210 (noting that the court consulted dictionaries 
contemporaneous with the Tariff Act). 
 257. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1295 (stating that “digital transmissions from 
satellites do not move through border crossings, nor can they be stopped at our 
borders via any enforcement mechanism contemplated in the statutory scheme”). 
 258. See id. at 1308 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“It cannot have been the legislative 
intent to stop the statute with the forms of ‘article’ then known.”). 
 259. Id. at 1306 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 
U.S. 390, 396 (1968)). 
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Further, as Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent to the 
decision denying the rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit’s stance 
on an article of manufacture counters the reading of the term in 
patent law.260  In passing Section 337, Congress aimed to protect 
domestic industry by safeguarding against unfair competition from 
imports that infringe upon U.S. intellectual property rights, including 
patents.261  Thus, when interpreting the term “article” in Section 337, 
the Federal Circuit should have maintained a reading consistent with 
the interpretation of the term in the utility patent statute.  Based on 
the limited definition of manufacture that the Federal Circuit adopted 
in Nuijten, which rejected a watermarked electronic signal as 
patentable subject matter, the court did just that:  it continued to read 
the term in a more limited light.262  However, as discussed earlier, in 
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court established its broad, inclusive view of 
utility patentable subject matter.263  The Court explained that 
“Congress is free to amend” the patent statute, insofar as to limit any 
subsequent interpretation by the courts.264  Contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s reading, the Federal Circuit in ClearCorrect, acknowledging that 
the last revision of Section 337 occurred prior to the creation of the 
Internet, stated the opposite of the Supreme Court:  “Congress is in a 
far better position to draw the lines” of what should be included in the 
meaning of articles within Section 337.265  Therefore, even though it 
did not interpret the patent statute directly, the Federal Circuit still 
severely limited a remedial option available to patentees. 
ClearCorrect, which involved a three-dimensional digital model, is 
the case most analogous to a design patent dispute involving a model 
found in VR or AR.  While it is possible to argue that the ClearCorrect 
court’s decision is only applicable to the meaning of an article within 
                                                          
 260. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334, 
1338–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“It is established 
that digital products are ‘goods’ and ‘merchandise’ and that their transmission via 
the Internet is an importation into the United States.  It is established that digital 
goods are subject to the patent law.  No authority has held that infringing digital 
goods that are imported electronically are not subject to the laws of infringement or 
of importation.”). 
 261. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (finding that Congress intended the scope of Section 337 to be broad). 
 262. See ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1286 (rejecting the broad interpretation of the 
term “articles”). 
 263. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (discussing an inclusive 
subject matter interpretation of § 101). 
 264. Id. 
 265. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1302 (quoting Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 
F.3d 1367, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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the ITC’s jurisdictional statute, this seems increasingly doubtful 
because of the court’s view of an electronic signal in Nuijten.266  Thus, 
based on ClearCorrect and Nuijten, it is unlikely that upon hearing a 
case directly interpreting the term “article of manufacture” within 
§ 171, the Federal Circuit would expand this position.  In fact, it is 
more likely that the court imports Nuijten’s interpretation of § 101 
into § 171, overruling CCPA’s Hruby decision and ending the 
USPTO’s practice of granting design patents for software icons. 
B. The Changes in the Design Patent Statute Allude to a Broad 
Interpretation 
Based on the text of § 171, its legislative history, as well as how the 
courts have incorporated the interpretations of the utility patent 
statute into design patent law, the Federal Circuit should adopt a 
broad view of the article of manufacture requirement.  A textual 
analysis of § 171 supports a broad interpretation of the article of 
manufacture requirement.  The statute currently requires that a 
design merely be “for an article of manufacture.”267  This broad 
language demonstrates the statute’s comprehensive scope.268 
Further, the consistent simplification of the statutory language 
reflects Congress’s preference for an inclusive patent subject matter 
policy.269  Over a period of sixty years, Congress repeatedly simplified 
the language of § 171 from narrow, enumerated categories to broad, 
general language including “any” and “manufacture.”270  This 
legislative history further indicates that Congress rejected a narrow 
interpretation of the article of manufacture requirement. 
Finally, the broad interpretation of the analogous utility patent 
provision § 101 also supports a broad interpretation of the design 
patent provision § 171.  In Chakrabarty, for instance, the Supreme 
Court construed § 101 and emphasized that, by choosing words like 
“any” and “manufacture,” Congress intended for courts to read § 101 
                                                          
 266. See supra Section II.A.1 (analyzing the implications of the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of a watermarked electronic signal). 
 267. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 268. In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 206 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“The proposed statute 
removes all this specific statement, for the reason that as the statute stands it does not 
include all the subjects which ought to be included, and from the inclusion of a 
portion it suggests the non-inclusion of those not mentioned.” (quoting USPTO 
Comm’r Allen in a letter to Congress supporting the 1902 amendments)). 
 269. See id. at 205–06. 
 270. See supra Section I.C.1 (providing an overview of the history of § 171’s 
changing language). 
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broadly.271  It also found ample support in § 101’s legislative history 
supporting this view.272  The incorporation of these utility patent 
provisions into § 171 therefore stems from § 171’s wording and 
legislative history because § 171 is “subject to the conditions and 
requirements of [Title 35].”273  Moreover, Congress’s preference for an 
inclusive subject matter policy in § 171 is in accord with the Court’s 
interpretation of § 101.274  The language of § 171 and § 101 uses 
similarly expansive terms such as “any” and “manufacture.”275  Thus, like 
the language and legislative history of § 101, the language and legislative 
history of § 171 allude to an inclusive, broad reading.276  Further, the 
courts have previously looked to the utility patent statute to justify 
broadly construing other terms in § 171.  This practice of incorporating 
§ 101 to set the boundaries of § 171 should therefore make the Federal 
Circuit feel comfortable continuing that trend and establishing a broad 
interpretation of § 171’s article of manufacture requirement. 
Thus, because of the choice of language in the statute, the 
legislative history of § 171, and the tradition of incorporating 
analogous provisions of the utility patent statute, the Federal Circuit 
should read the statutory language “article of manufacture” broadly. 
C. Applying the Broad Interpretation of § 171 
1. The Hruby view of an article of manufacture includes three-dimensional 
digital models 
When the CCPA adopted a broad interpretation of § 171 in Hruby, 
it provided a helpful framework to analyze three-dimensional digital 
                                                          
 271. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such 
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the 
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be 
given wide scope.”). 
 272. Id. at 308–09 (citing the early history of the first Patent Act of 1793, including 
thoughts of the author, Thomas Jefferson, that defined statutory subject matter as 
“any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new or useful improvement” (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 
319)); supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
view in Chakrabarty). 
 273. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012); see supra Section I.B.2(a) (recognizing the courts’ 
importation of utility patent statutory provisions into design patent law). 
 274. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–10 (discussing an inclusive view of patentable 
subject matter based on its interpretation of § 101). 
 275. 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
 276. See In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205–06 (C.C.P.A. 1931). 
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models.  Specifically, the Hruby court considered the design’s 
permanence, tangibility, and dependence.277 
Patentability hinges on the ordinary observer’s perception of the 
three-dimensional model, not whether the virtual design itself is 
tangible.278  Just as the fountain in Hruby ends when the water flow 
stops, a three-dimensional model in the virtual world ceases to 
exist when the computer acting as the engine of the virtual world 
is shut down.  However, the ephemerality of the design should not 
limit its ability to be protected.279  “Presence” within the VR and 
AR worlds allows for the creation of an environment that an 
observer’s mind considers reality.280  Accordingly, while the VR or 
AR technology is in use, an observer views a three-dimensional 
model as if it constantly appeared, much like the fountain in Hruby 
had a “constant” appearance.281  Hence, a three-dimensional 
model should not be precluded from design patent protection just 
because it only exists while in use.  Further, a three-dimensional 
model’s dependence on a computer engine should not exclude 
the model from being considered an article of manufacture.  Just 
like the fountain in Hruby depended on water flow to operate, a 
three-dimensional model depends on the computer that generates 
it.  Moreover, the CCPA in Hruby explicitly held that dependency 
does not preclude a design from being considered an article of 
manufacture under § 171.282  Accordingly, the fact that a three-
dimensional digital model is dependent on the computer should 
not preclude it from being considered an article of manufacture 
and receiving design patent protection. 
                                                          
 277. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 999–1001 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see supra text 
accompanying notes 124–36. 
 278. Cf. Seymour & Torrance, supra note 88, at 197 (discussing the holding of 
Hruby and emphasizing that the CCPA focused on “the perception of a design . . . not 
whether the design is comprised of tangible, solid matter”). 
 279. See Hruby, 373 F.2d at 999 (rejecting the proposition that the temporary 
nature of the droplets in a fountain should be a bar to design patentability, agreeing 
that “[i]t is true that a particular droplet or droplets may be ‘a fleeting product[,]’ 
but the fountain . . . in its entirety under proper conditions presents a product of 
constant appearance rather than a fleeting product” (citation omitted)). 
 280. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (emphasizing that VR devices 
now create “presence,” which deceives the user’s mind into believing the 
environment is real and not controlled by outside computer technology). 
 281. See Hruby, 373 F.2d at 999. 
 282. See id. at 1001; see also supra note 135 (providing examples of other designs 
that had been granted design patent protection despite being dependent on other 
materials). 
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Including three-dimensional models in the scope of § 171 does not 
alter the test for design patent infringement.  Design patent 
infringement is judged from the perspective of an “ordinary 
observer.”283  The test evaluates whether a purchaser would find 
substantial similarities between a protected design and the alleged 
infringing design.284  Therefore, if an ordinary observer would view 
the three-dimensional digital model and confuse it with a protected 
design, then it is possible to find infringement even though the 
infringing object is a digital model rather than a physical object.285 
Furthermore, the size and mobility of a design do not affect 
whether the design constitutes an article of manufacture within the 
meaning of § 171.286  The Hruby court and, prior, the Hadden court, 
underscored what constitutes an article of manufacture and clarified 
that size and mobility should not restrict this definition.287  Thus, a 
three-dimensional digital model should not be blocked from design 
patent protection simply because it does not have a physical size and 
is not physically mobile. 
2. The USPTO has adopted the Hruby court’s view and should issue 
patents for three-dimensional digital models that are present in VR and AR 
The USPTO expanded the meaning of an article of manufacture to 
include software icons, adopting the Hruby court’s broad view of 
patentability.288  As technology has progressed, the software industry 
has shifted away from programming three-dimensional models for 
display on the computer screen towards creating environments in the 
VR and AR worlds.289  Thus, because the USPTO has already shown 
that it wants to protect new technologies by adopting the Hruby court’s 
                                                          
 283. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) (establishing the test for 
design patent infringement); see also 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012) (enumerating the 
statutory requirement to bring a design patent infringement suit). 
 284. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. 
 285. The success of the Oculus Rift and its ability to create “presence” further 
bolsters this point.  See Lang, supra note 43 (discussing achieving “presence” in virtual 
reality); supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (underscoring the effect that 
achieving “presence” has had on the commercial success of the Oculus). 
 286. See In re Hadden, 20 F.2d 275, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1927); see also Hruby, 373 F.2d at 
1000 (reaffirming the Hadden court’s statement on size and mobility requirements). 
 287. See Hruby, 373 F.2d at 1000; Hadden, 20 F.2d at 276. 
 288. See MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I)(A) (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (citing Hruby, 373 
F.2d at 1001); supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text (chronicling the USPTO’s 
recognition of software icons as patentable designs under § 171). 
 289. See supra Section I.A (providing an overview of the history and development 
of VR and AR technologies). 
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view, it should follow this next progression of technology and explicitly 
permit design patents to issue for three-dimensional digital models. 
It is irrelevant that the three-dimensional model does not appear 
directly on the computer screen like the permitted software icon.  As 
the Board at the USPTO decided in Strijland, Tayama, and Donoghue, 
a software icon would be supported only if it was an ornamentality 
“for an article of manufacture.”290  Thus, the USPTO eventually 
granted design patent protection for software icons if the claim 
included an outline around the icon representative of the computer 
screen.291  The USPTO’s view of the computer icon as being an 
ornamentality “for an article of manufacture” should not apply to 
three-dimensional models.  Because the VR and AR technologies’ 
achievement of “presence” has blurred the lines between the digital 
and the physical worlds, it is no longer necessary to distinguish when 
an object appears on a computer screen by using solid or dashed 
lines around the claimed digital design.292 
The USPTO should grant design patent protection without 
requiring use of a solid or dashed line around the claim because, while 
a three-dimensional model is a digital design, it is different from a 
software icon.  The key difference between the two is that a software 
icon itself exists on a computer screen or as part of a software program, 
making it unclear how the icon is displayed without providing the 
context of the computer screen.293  Unlike a software icon, a three-
dimensional model does not need context for the user to understand 
how the model is displayed because the model is presented as part of 
physical reality, not a computer screen.  Therefore, the USPTO should 
continue to use the broad view of the Hruby court and grant protection 
to three-dimensional digital models. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit should abandon the recently adopted line of 
reasoning interpreting an article of manufacture as a physical, 
                                                          
 290. See Ex parte Donoghue, No. 92-0539, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266, 1268 (B.P.A.I. 
Apr. 2, 1992); Ex parte Strijland No. 92-0623, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1259, 1261 (B.P.A.I. 
Apr. 2, 1992); Ex parte Tayama, No. 92-0624, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1615 (B.P.A.I. 
Apr. 2, 1992); supra Section I.C.3 (documenting the history of appeals leading to 
software icons being recognized as design patentable subject matter). 
 291. See MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I)(A). 
 292. See supra Section I.A.2 (illustrating the maturity of the VR and AR 
technologies through the achievement of “presence” and, as a result, the blurring of 
the physical and digital worlds). 
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 148–52. 
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tangible object in the utility patent and ITC jurisdictional statutes.  In 
its most recent interpretation of § 171, the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor court, the CCPA, broadened the definition of an article 
of manufacture to include a fountain, an object that is dependent on 
a machine to run, ephemeral, and transient.294  This expansion is in 
accord with the simplification of § 171, which moved from 
enumerated categories of subject matter to a much broader 
wording.295  Just as the USPTO expanded design patent subject 
matter to include software icons, the court should interpret articles of 
manufacture to include three-dimensional digital models.  The 
inclusion of digital models will allow designers who are developing 
items for use in VR and AR worlds, as well as those designers whose 
items already exist in the physical world, to fully protect their 
intellectual property rights thus ensuring that statutory structure 
keeps pace with the boom in VR and AR technologies.  Without 
abandoning its current course, the Federal Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation puts design patent protection of these new 
technologies at risk. 
                                                          
 294. See In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 295. See Seymour & Torrence, supra note 88, at 192. 
